We propose that Mealey's model is limited in its description of sociopathy because it does not provide an adequate role for the main organ mediating genes and behavior, namely, the brain. Further, on the basis of our research, we question the view of sociopaths as a homogeneous group.

The medical specialty of psychiatry should possess a basic science in which pathologies are considered deviations from normal brain physiology. Historically, psychoanalytic pathogenesis was considered separately from brain physiology. It was not scientific because observations could not be refuted. Countering this, Eli Robins's legacy stemmed partly from his having been damaged by a psychoanalyst. It eschewed pathogenesis. Attempting to integrate psychiatry with medicine more generally, Robins and colleagues refocused on empiricism, although they acknowledged the brain's centrality. Here I hold that (...) the term biology used in the context of psychiatry should broadly encompass social facets of organismal function. The term sociophysiology may best describe the central basic science of psychiatry because it alludes to brain functions used for the person's social realm. Disruptions of such functions result in deviant behaviors and unpleasant feelings which psychiatrists diagnose and treat. Future study encompassing top-down and bottom-up research should include genome-neural-behavioral analyses. (shrink)

The medical specialty of psychiatry should possess a basic science in which pathologies are considered deviations from normal brain physiology. Historically, psychoanalytic pathogenesis was considered separately from brain physiology. It was not scientific because observations could not be refuted. Countering this, Eli Robins's legacy stemmed partly from his having been damaged by a psychoanalyst. It eschewed pathogenesis. Attempting to integrate psychiatry with medicine more generally, Robins and colleagues refocused on empiricism, although they acknowledged the brain's centrality. Here I hold that (...) the term biology used in the context of psychiatry should broadly encompass social facets of organismal function. The term “sociophysiology” may best describe the central basic science of psychiatry because it alludes to brain functions used for the person's social realm. Disruptions of such functions result in deviant behaviors and unpleasant feelings which psychiatrists diagnose and treat. Future study encompassing top-down and bottom-up research should include genome-neural-behavioral analyses. (shrink)

Institutional review boards are almost universally considered to be overworked and understaffed. They also require substantial commitments of time and resources from their members. Although some surveys report average IRB memberships of 15 people or more, federal regulations require only five. We present data on IRB meetings at eight of the top 25 academic medical centers in the United States funded by the National Institutes of Health. These data indicate substantial contributions from primary reviewers and chairs during protocol discussions but (...) little from other members, which implies that it may be possible for smaller IRBs to accomplish the same tasks with no reduction in the quality of review. (shrink)

Patients have received experimental pharmaceuticals outside of clinical trials for decades. There are no industry-wide best practices, and many companies that have granted compassionate use, or ‘preapproval’, access to their investigational products have done so without fanfare and without divulging the process or grounds on which decisions were made. The number of compassionate use requests has increased over time. Driving the demand are new treatments for serious unmet medical needs; patient advocacy groups pressing for access to emerging treatments; internet platforms (...) enabling broad awareness of compelling cases or novel drugs and a lack of trust among some that the pharmaceutical industry and/or the FDA have patients’ best interests in mind. High-profile cases in the media have highlighted the gap between patient expectations for compassionate use and company utilisation of fair processes to adjudicate requests. With many pharmaceutical manufacturers, patient groups, healthcare providers and policy analysts unhappy with the inequities of the status quo, fairer and more ethical management of compassionate use requests was needed. This paper reports on a novel collaboration between a pharmaceutical company and an academic medical ethics department that led to the formation of the Compassionate Use Advisory Committee. Comprising medical experts, bioethicists and patient representatives, CompAC established an ethical framework for the allocation of a scarce investigational oncology agent to single patients requesting non-trial access. This is the first account of how the committee was formed and how it built an ethical framework and put it into practice. (shrink)

The article attempts to settle a controversy between d f pears and j o urmson over the nature of russell's early theory of memory. it is shown that contrary to what pears claims in his "bertrand russell and the british tradition in philosophy," russell had explicitly abandoned a realist account of memory by 1915. the article sides with urmson as against pears, but apparently both have overlooked two of russell's little noticed 1915 papers in the "monist.".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:358 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY und k6nnen es nur sein. Das Gleiche ist der Fall mit den Erfahrungstatsachen des wissenschaftlichen Versuches und im Grunde aller Wissenschaft gibt es nichts anderes und kann es nichts anderes geben. Mag ein gewandter Dialektiker die Voraussetzungen, yon denen er ausgeht, noch so sehr durcheinanderwirbeln, sie verbinden und zu Schliissen aufeinandertiirmen: Was er erhiilt, wird stets wieder eine Aussage sein. Niemals wird er zu einem (...) Gesetze gelangen, das lauten wiirde: Tue dies! oder Tue dies nicht! also zu einem Satze, der dem sittlichen Gesetze entsprechen oder ibm entgegenstehen kSnnte,r Kann Morscher dann noch immer behaupten, dass Poincar6 nur kategorische Syllogismen oder nur Schhssfolgerungen mit gerade Priimissen im Sinne hatte? Wir sind dem t3bersetzer eine Ehrenrettung schuldig: wenn er hier "syllogisme" mit "logischer Schluss" iibersetzt hat, hat er keinen Fehler begangen, es trifft ihn nicht der Tadel, durch eine scblechte Ubersetzung eine Legende hervorgerufen zu haben. Morscher soUte jedoch nicht, wenn er "syllogisme" liest, "kategorischer Syllogismus" verstehen, lind bei geistesgeschichtlichen Diskussionen immer den hermeneutisch relevanten Kontext beachten, d.h. wnigstens den Absatz, den er gerade analysiert, zu Ende lesen. Es liisst sich rticht daran zweifeln, dass Hare mit Recht [PR] Poincar6 zuschreibt. Nicht ganz sicher bin ich, ob Poincar6, wenn er sah und es ausdriicklich sagte, dass die iiblichen logischen Regeln fiir Imperativfolgerung nicht anwendbar sind, damit auch gleichzeitig die Entwicklung einer Imperativlogik (Normenlogik) forderte, oder ob er sich dieser programmatischen Konsequenz nicht ganz bewusst war. OTAWEINBERGER Universitiit Graz RUSSELL'S REALIST THEORY OF REMOTE MEMORY In a paper on Bertrand Russell's theory of memory1 David Pears undertakes to amend certain aspects of his version of Russell's theory of memory which he had presented in his Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy. ~ In that work Pears had attributed to Russell an extreme realist theory of memory from 1905 through 1918, i.e., a general theory of memory according to which the mind maintains direct contact by the dual relation of acquaintance with past sense-data. 3 This, he now believes, is historically incorrect in view of two of Russell's lesser known papers which have since come to his attention and which make it clear that in 1915 Russell held the extreme realist account only in connection with immediate memory--i.e., with memory within what is often called the specious present--and that as regards remote memory--i.e., memory of things not very recent and, so, outside the specious present--past sense-data 7 Poincare, Letzte Gedanken, aus dem FranzSsischen iibersetzt yon Karl Lichteneeker (Leipzig : Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1913),pp. 226 f. 1 D. F. Pears, "Russell's Theories of Memory 1912-1921," in Bertrand Russell's Philosophy, ed. George Nakhnikian (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 117-137. The papers are from the Indiana University Russell centenary conference, 1972. 2 (London: Collins~I967), pp. 7I, 181-182. 3 Ibid. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 359 were knowable only by description and not by acquaintance.4 But Pears still argues, as against J. O. Urmson,5 that Russell did hold the realist theory of remote memory before 1915, although he was "changing his mind" in that year and, by 1917 ("The Philosophy of Logical Atomism"), had definitely abandoned the theory,e I believe that Pears is partly right about this matter: Russell almost certainly did hold a realist theory of remote memory before 1915. However, it can be shown, I think, that the theory was abandoned, not in 1915 or later, but in 1914. Pears shows beyond any reasonable doubt that Russell held a realist theory of remote memory in 1912. The strongest evidence may be found in a passage in Problems of Philosophy: There is some danger of confusion as to the nature of memory, owing to the fact that memory of an object is apt to be accompanied by an image of the object, and yet the image cannot be what constitutes memory. This is easily seen by merely noticing that the image is in the present, whereas what is remembered is known to be in the past. Moreover, we are certainly able to some extent to compare our image with the object remembered, so that we often know, within... (shrink)

A recent trend in Russell scholarship has been towards the thesis that, contrary to his own recollections, Bertrand Russell really didn’t need the 1905 theory of descriptions to deflate an excessive ontology, because (1) there was no excessive ontology in The Principles of Mathematics, at least not one with golden mountains and the like, and so (2) Russell’s real motive, at least his main one, was not ontological but rather was to replace the incoherent sense–reference distinction on (...) which the old theory of denoting depended. I want to gently dispute that thesis by showing that Russell’s old theory in the Principles was ambivalent on ontic commitment to non-existent things and it could not give an adequate account of the central problem which Russell faced before “On Denoting”, viz. our apparent discourse—including our ability to make true and false propositions—about non-existent things. I also show briefly how the new theory solves the old problem. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviews  YOURS FAITHFULLY P L. T Religious Studies / McGill U. Montreal, , Canada   @-.. Ray Perkins, Jr., ed. Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: a Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor. Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, . Pp. xii, . .; pb .. lthough Bertrand Russell was obviously a prolific writer on numerous Atopics (technical philosophy, education, (...) religion, political critique, women ’s rights, and nuclear disarmament), and published his views through various venues such as technical volumes, popular books, essays, scholarly articles, reviews, and pamphlets, there has been a neglect of Russell’s utilization of the newspaper’s “Letters to the Editor” section. In this accessible volume, Ray Perkins has collected and organized the letters to the editor published by Russell. Russell, from the first known letter in  to the final public statement on the Middle East crisis published posthumously in , published approximately  letters to the editor. Of these  are published in Yours Faithfully. Perkins begins with a helpful introduction (pp. –), placing the letters into the broader framework of Russell’s life. We are introduced, in a very basic sketch, to the development of Russell’s thought, encountering such major threads in Russell’s life as his early political interests (indicated in  with German Social Democracy, though pushed to the foreground with the First World War) and the developments in his philosophical theories from Principia Mathematica through Our Knowledge of the External World to Human Knowledge. We also meet various significant individuals in Russell’s life, such as his various wives and his colleagues both in philosophy and in activist work. Although Russell scholars will find this introduction somewhat simplistic, those non-specialists encountering Russell through this book will find the introduction helpful and clearly necessary in order to contextualize the letters.  Reviews The letters themselves are organized into chronological chapters. The first eight letters, “Early Letters”, are dated from  to . These are the earliest known published letters by Russell. Perkins then gives us those letters published during the First World War (–). The remaining letters fall into: “Between the Wars” (–); “World War Two and the Early Cold War” (–); “The Cold War and the Nuclear Peril” (–); and “The Cold War and American Militarism” (–). The final document is Russell’s posthumous  statement to the Conference of Parliamentarians in Cairo. Each chapter has a brief overview of the period in Russell’s life, further situating the letters. Perkins is also careful to offer introductions to each letter, and the occasional footnote to explain various references in the letters (names of individuals that may not be familiar to readers, major events referred to, etc.). Each letter is numbered sequentially, accompanied by the B&R number of the letter. Given Russell’s diverse interests, clearly reflected in these letters, Perkins has subdivided the last four chapters into thematic subsections. Those readers who are interested in Russell’s views on, e.g., religion, education, or Vietnam can find the relevant letters with ease. A comprehensive index also makes the collection accessible. The exact division of the chapters tends to reflect major shifts in Russell’s thinking as much as historical developments (the latter obviously affecting the former in any case). For example, the – break reflects both Russell’s move from England to the  and his departure from the pacifist stance of Which Way to Peace? The – break reflects Russia’s development of nuclear weapons and Russell’s shift towards mutual disarmament by both superpowers. And the – break reflects Russell’s intervention in the Cuban Missile Crisis as well as his reactions to the  involvement in Vietnam. Perkins has supplied us with an excellent collection of letters. Although some may ask how useful such a collection may be, I would contend that the letters are vital sources of information for Russell studies. First, from an historian’s perspective, the preservation and accessibility of primary material is a noble and worthwhile achievement. Perkins is to be commended for his efforts in drawing our attention to this material by blowing the dust off material that most would ignore. Second, the letters themselves are fascinating indications of shifts in Russell’s thinking, pointing out the nuances of such shifts as he engages in debate with various other voices over... (shrink)

The wrongness of rape -- Rationality and the rule of law in offences against the person -- Complicity and causality -- In defence of defences -- Justifications and reasons -- The gist of excuses -- Fletcher on offences and defences -- Provocation and pluralism -- The mark of responsibility -- The functions and justifications of criminal law and punishment -- Crime : in proportion and in perspective -- Reply to critics.

A Teacher's Manual for this book will be available online at www.temple.edu/tempress.

The _Analects_ is a compendium of the sayings of Confucius (551-479 b.c.e.), transcribed and passed down by his disciples. How it came to be transformed by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) into one of the most philosophically significant texts in the Confucian tradition is the subject of this book. Scholarly attention in China had long been devoted to the _Analects._ By the time of Zhu Xi, a rich history of commentary had grown up around it. But Zhu, claiming that the _Analects_ was (...) one of the authoritative texts in the canon and should be read before all others, gave it a still more privileged status in the tradition. He spent decades preparing an extended interlinear commentary on it. Sustained by a newer, more elaborate language of metaphysics, Zhu's commentary on the _Analects_ marked a significant shift in the philosophical orientation of Confucianism--a shift that redefined the Confucian tradition for the next eight centuries, not only in China, but in Japan and Korea well. Gardner's translations and analysis of Zhu Xi's commentary on the _Analects_ show one of China's great thinkers in an interesting and complex act of philosophical negotiation. Through an interlinear, line-by-line "dialogue" with Confucius, Zhu effected a reconciliation of the teachings of the Master, commentary by later exegetes, and contemporary philosophical concerns of Song-dynasty scholars. By comparing Zhu's reading of the _Analects_ with the earlier standard reading by He Yan (190-249), Gardner illuminates what is dramatically new in Zhu Xi's interpretation of the _Analects._ A pioneering study of Zhu Xi's reading of the _Analects,_ this book demonstrates how commentary is both informed by a text and informs future readings, and highlights the importance of interlinear commentary as a genre in Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

A noted author defends his personal attitudes toward the fundamental issues of classical philosophy, discussing the awesome mystery surrounding science and life and explaining why he considers himself a theist.

By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish (...) three cases: (1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., `the present King of France'. (2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g., `the present King of England' denotes a certain man. (3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g. `a man' denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man. The interpretation of such phrases is a matter of considerably difficulty; indeed, it is very hard to frame any theory not susceptible of formal refutation. All the difficulties with which I am acquainted are met, so far as I can discover, by the theory which I am about to explain. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was one of the greatest logicians since Aristotle, and one of the most important philosophers of the past two hundred years. As we approach the 125th anniversary of the Nobel laureate's birth, his works continue to spark debate, resounding with unmatched timeliness and power. The Problems of Philosophy, one of the most popular works in Russell's prolific collection of writings, has become core reading in philosophy. Clear and accessible, this little book is an intelligible and stimulating (...) guide to those problems of philosophy which often mistakenly lead to its status as too lofty and abstruse for the lay mind. Focusing on problems he believes will provoke positive and constructive discussion, Russell concentrates on knowledge rather than metaphysics, steering the reader through his famous 1910 distinction between "knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description," and introducing important theories of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Hume, Locke, Plato, and others to lay the foundation for philosophical inquiry by general readers and scholars alike.With a new introduction by John Perry, this valuable work is a perfect introduction to the field and will continue to stimulate philosophical discussion as it has done for nearly forty years. (shrink)

This brilliant and controversial work investigates the relationship between 'individual' and 'scientific' knowledge.

Published in 1903, this book was the first comprehensive treatise on the logical foundations of mathematics written in English. It sets forth, as far as possible without mathematical and logical symbolism, the grounds in favour of the view that mathematics and logic are identical. It proposes simply that what is commonly called mathematics are merely later deductions from logical premises. It provided the thesis for which _Principia Mathematica_ provided the detailed proof, and introduced the work of Frege to a wider (...) audience. In addition to the new introduction by John Slater, this edition contains Russell's introduction to the 1937 edition in which he defends his position against his formalist and intuitionist critics. (shrink)